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Twenty years ago, Gould and Lewontinpublished The Spandrels of San
Marco and the Panglossian paradigm: 
a critique of the adaptationist pro-
gramme1. In it, they described ‘the adap-
tationist program’ as an attempt to
explain the existence and the particular
forms of any phenotypic trait as the
result of natural selection. The paper’s
exotic title derived from the example
with which the piece began. The authors
noted that the tapered spaces (the ‘span-
drels’) between the archways supporting
the domed roof of the basilica of 
St Mark’s in Venice were beautifully deco-
rated in a way that made admirable use of
the triangular space. They claimed that
although this space was put to great
artistic use, it was an architectural by-
product of employing arches to support
a domed room, and was not designed for
that artistic use. The lesson to learn is
that when faced with a ‘trait’ that is being
put to good use, one ought not to jump to
the conclusion that the particular use is
the reason the trait is present. Gould and
Lewontin argued that a particularly
sloppy form of evolutionary thinking did
just that, and that its practitioners
assumed that any trait had to have a
good use to explain its presence, even if
none was obvious. Gould and Lewontin
proceeded to criticize the assumptions
that such a program depended upon
(Box 1), and laid out an alternative
approach that they felt better accounted
for the complexities of the evolutionary
process.
Over the past 20 years, Spandrels
has been much cited and criticized. 
Criticisms have ranged from the signifi-
cant – for example, that the role of con-
straints in evolution is over-stated2 – to
the irrelevant (i.e. that the architectural
feature they referred to is really called a
‘pendentive’ not a spandrel3). Today, it
is commonplace to pay lip service to the
sorts of difficulties involved in demon-
strating that a trait is ‘adaptive’, which
Gould and Lewontin pointed out. Twenty
years is a long enough time for the dust
to have settled and to ask to what extent
the difficulties raised by the original
paper can now be addressed. How have
conceptual and empirical advances
helped us to move away from adaptation-
ist story-telling and towards testable
hypotheses involving adaptation?
Whence Spandrels?
Before trying to answer these questions,
it is worth thinking about what Gould and
Lewontin’s attack on the adaptationist
program was motivated by. In large part,
it was a reaction to two related phenom-
ena: the rise of sociobiology, attributable
in large part to E.O. Wilson’s 1975 book
by the same name4; and the populari-
zation of the narrowly ‘gene-centric’
approach favored by Dawkins and
defended explicitly in his 1976 book The
Selfish Gene5. Those features that Gould
and Lewontin claim describe the theory
and the practice of adaptationism bear
directly upon the styles of reasoning
used in these arenas.
As Lewontin has always been quick to
point out, sociobiology has primarily
been concerned with telling stories
about (for example) human behavior that
insinuate that such behavior is adaptive.
Adaptationists regard the consistency of
the trait with the hypothesis that it is an
adaptation shaped by natural selection
as good evidence for the conclusion that
it is. Arguments such as Dawkins’, which
were meant to demonstrate that the
focus of selective forces are individual
genes made visible to selection through
their direct relationship with particular
phenotypic features, were then an inte-
gral part of the adaptationist program.
These assumptions, when applied to
human behaviors, quickly yield conclu-
sions with dramatic political and social
implications6. The attack on adaptation-
ism expressed in Spandrels, and which
Lewontin and Gould each pursued in
many other works, would probably 
have been far less aggressive if the adap-
tive significance of the variation in 
the color of snail-shells were the only
thing at stake.
Rather than viewing organisms as col-
lections of more or less optimized indi-
vidual traits, Gould and Lewontin called
for the acknowledgment of other possi-
bilities and for predictions, made on the
basis of these alternative models, to be
compared (Boxes 2 and 3). They argued
that this entailed recognizing the legiti-
macy of different approaches to evolu-
tion in which constraints upon optimi-
zation through natural selection would
play a more central role. Of course, Gould
and Lewontin freely admitted that adap-
tation by natural selection has been, and
still is, a powerful force in shaping the
phenotypic traits of organisms. The
question they wished to raise was: what
kind of evidence is necessary to support
the hypothesis that a trait is an adapta-
tion formed by natural selection and
what evidence could point towards some
other cause of the current state of the
trait in question?
Conceptual advances since the
Spandrels
Since the publication of the Spandrels
paper, theoretical evolutionary biology
has made several advances that have
helped researchers to question a purely
adaptationist approach to the study of
phenotypic evolution. In particular, the
role of constraints, tradeoffs and costs in
evolution has been widely discussed and
generally acknowledged7–9. Although the
terminology of constraints is still vague,
most people seem to agree that at least
genetic and developmental (sometimes
referred to as epigenetic) constraints are
a reality, and can be both measured in
practice and accounted for in theory.
The common perception of the Fish-
erian idea that selection is an omni-
powerful force, which always brings a
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population to the maximum fitness peak
available in the adaptive landscape
(although Fisher’s contribution was actu-
ally more subtle than that and did not
make use of the landscape metaphor10),
has been dealt a fatal blow by more
recent advances in population genetics
theory. Fisher’s ‘fundamental theorem of
natural selection’11, often perceived as
the quintessential Panglossian paradigm,
was originally developed for the special
case of simple one locus–two allele sys-
tems (although it can be generalized for
multiple alleles). However, even slightly
more complex models, such as two loci
with epistasis, fecundity selection, link-
age disequilibrium and frequency depen-
dence, will often (albeit not necessarily)
result in adaptive landscapes character-
ized by maladaptive evolution in which
selection drives the population ‘down-
hill’12. More complex and more realistic
models have proven too difficult for easy
mathematical tractability. The currently
accepted generalization is that complex
genotypic architectures are less, not
more, amenable to being altered by natu-
ral selection13, that is, constraints are
indeed a common and inescapable 
feature of living systems14. However, 
the debate still rages around how 
much genetic information is necessary 
to include in models of evolutionary 
trajectories, with population geneticists
and optimality theorists discussing 
the possibility of a convergence of the
two approaches – the so-called ‘street-
car’ model15.
Another major (and slow in coming)
conceptual shift in evolutionary biology
theory, which has contributed to a wide-
spread questioning of the adaptationist
program, is the recognition of epigenesis
as a central, and largely misunderstood,
player in mediating the genotype–pheno-
type mapping function16. Perhaps in 
part because of the recent advances in
molecular developmental genetics17, not
an original component of the adaptation-
ist program, the simplistic idea of selec-
tion acting more or less directly on genes
is being set aside as a serious contender
in the evolutionary arena18. Even some
sociobiologists have backed down from
straight gene selection talk to embrace
perhaps more vague, but certainly more
realistic, ‘epigenetic rules’19. However, a
new brand of sociobiology, renamed
‘evolutionary psychology’, seems to be
retracing its ancestor’s path of mistakes
by making wild claims on the genetic
basis of human behavior while ignoring
the two decades of debate about the
adaptationist program20.
These observations suggest that
another way to avoid slipping into the
adaptationist habit (suggested by Gould
and Lewontin themselves) is to think not
about the current state of the trait, but
how, given its phylogenetic history and
functional significance, that trait should
be. Although a purely engineering
approach is not informative because it
fails to account for historical pathways,
once we take enough of the organism’s
basic developmental features into
account, an analysis in terms of optimiz-
ation theory can be revealing21. This can
then lead to the specification of appropri-
ate null hypotheses to test selective and
constraint scenarios.
However, the role of constraints in
evolution was probably oversold in the
immediate aftermath of the Spandrels.
This has led to an almost comic prolif-
eration of types of constraints, resulting
in a rather confusing terminology and 
literature22. Recently, Schlichting and
Pigliucci23 have attempted to simplify
and clarify the issue by proposing 
that all categories of constraints (with
the exception of absolute constraints
imposed by fundamental laws of physics)
can be considered genetic or epigenetic
in nature. This leaves selection and con-
straints as the two major deterministic
players on the evolutionary stage; some-
times these are in opposition, but other
times they work together to push a popu-
lation in one direction or another in an
adaptive landscape. It is this synthesis of
constraints (spandrelism) and selection
(panglossianism) that is the key to a
more sober and realistic understanding
of phenotypic evolution.
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Box 1. The objects of the attack
According to Gould and Lewontin1, the adaptationist program is characterized by the telling 
of stories involving natural selection, which account for the presence and particular forms of 
traits by reference to their hypothesized adaptive significance. Adaptationists assume the 
following:
Ontological assumptions
• Organisms can be usefully considered as assemblages of traits, the adaptive nature of which
can be considered independently of the others.
• Constraints on the power of natural selection can be assumed to be minor, thus adaptation by
natural selection is the proper null-hypothesis for particular traits, either behavioral or physical.
Methodological practices
• Consistency between the observed trait and an explanatory story told in terms of natural selec-
tion is sufficient for the preliminary acceptance of the hypothesis that the trait is adaptive and
evolved in just that way.
• The failure of one adaptive story leads immediately to the search for another story of the same
sort.
• Any failure of particular traits to be optimal is accounted for by evoking ‘trade-offs’ with other
adaptive traits.
• Because of these features, adaptive stories are easy to create and hard to falsify – hallmarks,
Gould and Lewontin argue, of poor scientific hypotheses. Indeed, they claim that it is difficult
to ever reject the hypothesis that the trait is adaptive (in some way or other) within the context
of the adaptationist program.
Box 2. Alternatives to adaptationism
Gould and Lewontin1 suggested that at least the following alternative hypotheses be considered
in attempts to understand the etiology of particular traits:
• No adaptation and no selection: the trait in question might be the result of genetic drift.
• Indirect selection: the trait in question is not the subject of selection – its features are the result
of its association with another trait (which might or might not have been the subject of natural
selection).
• Selection without adaptation: a trait might increase in frequency owing to natural selection but
might not be ‘adaptive’ as generally understood (Lewontin’s example involves a resource-
limited species and a genetic mutation that doubles fecundity: this does not increase the popu-
lation’s mean fitness, it only alters the population dynamics).
• Adaptation without selection: the trait itself might be adaptive but not explicitly the product of
selection for that particular form of the trait. Some types of phenotypic plasticity might be a
special case of this, as is behavioral flexibility. Although these abilities might be selected for,
the traits themselves (which are the result of the plasticity/flexibility) were not necessarily the
result of selection for that form of the trait.
• Adaptation and selection, but no basis for distinguishing between adaptations: although the
trait might be adaptive and have been selected for, there might be no way of distinguishing
between different forms of a trait on the basis of their adaptive significance (the problem of
multiple adaptive peaks).
• Adaptation and selection, but the particular adaptation represents a ‘secondary’ use of a trait
already present for other (generally historical) reasons. This is the case to which Gould and
Vrba43 later referred to as ‘exaptation’.
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The other factor that has been in-
creasingly taken into consideration by
theoretical evolutionary biologists in the
past decade is the fact that the environ-
ment (and therefore the adaptive land-
scape) is far from constant. Although
models of environmental heterogeneity
had been proposed before the Spandrels
paper24, the effects of environmental het-
erogeneity and the evolutionary strat-
egies or outcomes that it can elicit have
been investigated with a wider range of
theoretical tools, including quantitative
genetic and optimization models25,26. The
general agreement is that the external
environment poses as much of a limi-
tation to adaptive evolution as internal
(genetic–developmental, or epigenetic)
constraints, and that they both consti-
tute moving targets for natural selec-
tion23. Of course, this does not mean that
organisms do not evolve in response to
selection, but the currently available the-
ory leads us away from the idea of sur-
vival of the fittest and towards a model of
survival of the barely tolerable; this
model is analogous to the concept of 
‘satisficing’ in foraging theory27.
Some of these ideas were actually
expressed before the publication of the
Spandrels by Francois Jacob28, who 
elaborated a model of evolution as ‘tin-
kering’ (bricoleur, in the original French).
According to Jacob, natural selection
only works with the materials available
and within the constraints present at a
particular time in a particular place (see
the metaphor of the builder using stones
that fall from a cliffside in Darwin29).
Jacob might have struck closest to the
balance between spandrelism and adap-
tationism that we describe in this article.
Empirical advances since 
the Spandrels
Since the publication of the Spandrels,
the roles played by constraints in evolu-
tion have been investigated empirically.
We are now slowly gaining data on how
common constraints actually are and on
how they evolve when studied in the con-
text of phylogenetic hypotheses. Of
course, one must keep in mind that the
fallacy of spandrelism is as easy to com-
mit to as that of adaptationism. In particu-
lar, Gould has posited constraints for the
land snail Cerion30, whereas a computer
simulation of the shell morphospace has
actually indicated that such space is
essentially saturated, with no evidence of
a limitation on form31.
The empirical study of constraints
has been approached from different per-
spectives, but one of the most intriguing
from an evolutionary standpoint focuses
on research on the stability (or lack
thereof) of genetic variance–covariance
matrices. An example of this is the work
of Conner and Via32 on natural selection
on body size in the flour beetle Tribolium.
They estimated the intensity and the
direction of selection, concluding that it
would favor an increase in pupal weight
and a decrease in width in male beetles.
However, they detected a positive
genetic covariance between the two
characters. When they used this infor-
mation in a model predicting the prob-
able evolutionary response of the popu-
lation, they obtained a small change in
pupal weight (in spite of the strong selec-
tion coefficient) and a large increase in
width (in spite of selection acting in the
opposite direction). Several other stud-
ies of the stability of variance–covari-
ance matrices have been published33–36. 
Even though constraints exist, is it
possible to somehow ‘break’ them? In
other words, how stable are the genetic
covariances through evolutionary time?
Several approaches have been used 
to answer this question. For example,
Steppan37 has reconstructed the evolu-
tion of variance–covariance matrices
using a phylogenetic hypothesis describ-
ing the historical branching of the leaf-
eared mice of the genus Phyllotis. He 
concluded that the matrix describing 
the evolution of cranial characters is
variable within species, and that this
variation sorts out taxa at higher phylo-
genetic levels. Therefore, Steppan con-
cludes that there is ‘no support (for)
attempts to extrapolate structure to
explain or predict macroevolutionary
change’. However, experimental manipu-
lations of genetic matrices by mutation-
selection studies have also pointed
towards the stability of at least some 
constraints in the cruficer plant 
Arabidopsis thaliana38. 
Immediately after the publication of
the Spandrels, Lande and Arnold39 de-
veloped a conceptually straightforward
way to measure natural selection and to
determine its magnitude and its type.
The idea is to use a regression analysis of
the trait(s) of interest against a reason-
able measure of fitness. Many variations
and improvements on this theme have
been proposed since, including the use of
genotypic rather than phenotypic data40,
path analysis41 and nonparametric tech-
niques42. Of course, demonstrating selec-
tion currently acting on a character is not
the same as demonstrating that the char-
acter is an adaptation in the historical
process sense of the term43, but it is 
a necessary step to build the case for 
current adaptive value. 
Such a case can then be expanded by
the use of manipulative experiments,
both under controlled and field condi-
tions. These experiments have a long and
venerable history in evolutionary biol-
ogy44, and can be used to bridge the gap
between simply demonstrating the
action of selection and actually identify-
ing the causes underlying the observed
selection gradients. Along similar lines,
experimental evolutionary research has
been conducted on a series of model
organisms45. In these cases, one starts
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Box 3. On constraints versus selection: which is the correct null hypothesis?
The problem with constraints, as Antonovics and van Tienderen22 insightfully remarked, is that it
is difficult to envision what the null hypothesis is. A potentially useful method that can be applied
to test both spandrelism and panglossianism has been discussed in some detail by Schlichting
and Pigliucci23. This is based on the idea of transitional probability matrices. These matrices specify
what the probability of a given evolutionary change is against the probabilities of alternative 
evolutionary pathways. The theoretical biologist is, therefore, forced to explicitly formulate
hypotheses in statistical terms. One could then, in principle, measure actual probabilities 
(e.g. from a phylogenetically informed data set) and compare the empirical data with the predictions
by means of any matrix-comparison algorithm50. 
The examples here represent possible transitional matrices for the simple case of three character
states (A,B,C) under neutral evolution or stabilizing selection. The entries represent the probability
of a given state to evolve from a certain initial condition (given in the columns) to another condition
or to remain invariant (rows). In the case of neutral evolution, one might model the situation by
assigning the same probability to any transition (including from a given state to the same state,
i.e. no change). Stabilizing selection could be modeled by a matrix that includes high probability of
the phenotype to converge on one state (B in the example) and a low probability of any other state
to evolve or to be maintained. Notice that the sum of the probabilities along a given column must
be one (i.e. there are no other possibilities aside from the ones considered in the matrix). 
Neutral evolution From 
A B C
A 0.33 0.33 0.33
To B 0.33 0.33 0.33
C 0.33 0.33 0.33
Stabilizing selection From
A B C
A 0.05 0.05 0.05
To B 0.90 0.90 0.90  
C 0.05 0.05 0.05
(Online: Table I and II)
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out with a base population that is sub-
jected to a novel environment. The evolu-
tionary trajectories that yield an in-
creased adaptation to that environment
are then followed and compared with
predictions based on a priori functional
and quantitative genetic models. All of
these approaches are yielding more sat-
isfactory insights into the dynamics and
constraints of adaptive phenotypic evo-
lution. This information is crucial to
assess the actual balance between non-
adaptive forces and selection in natural
populations.
The new synthesis between
spandrelism and adaptationism
The difficulty of assessing where the true
middle lies between spandrelism and
panglossianism is to be found in the fact
that biology is partly an experimental 
science, but partly a historical one. It is
this historical component that makes it
difficult, albeit not impossible, to deduce
the underlying processes by observing
the patterns they produce, because simi-
lar patterns can be the outcome of differ-
ent processes. For example, we have
mentioned the study of natural selection
by the use of regression techniques. Even
when successful, such techniques tell us
little or nothing about the nature of the
observed selection46. What aspects of the
environment are exerting the selective
force? How does variation in the genetic
architecture of the traits under selection
allow the population to respond? What
other, unmeasured, traits might be 
driving the dynamics of the system? The
answers to these questions do not come
easily, and they can be sought only
through a complex feedback between
field studies and manipulative exper-
iments, combined with mechanistic
knowledge of the epigenetics of the traits
themselves.
From the standpoint of theory, quan-
titative genetics and optimization theo-
ries have contributed substantially 
to our understanding of the interplay
between selection and constraints. How-
ever, neither approach is without severe
limitations47. As far as quantitative gen-
etics is concerned, several authors have
demonstrated that the relationship be-
tween the observable genetic variance–
covariance matrix and the underlying
genetic architecture is not as simple as it
was once thought48,49. One cannot
deduce the existence (or inexistence) of
a constraint simply because a genetic
correlation has been observed (or not).
Optimization theory has shown its own
limits by demonstrating that the more
complex and ‘multitasking’ a phenotype
is, the more likely one is to find many
alternative ‘optimal’ designs21. Although
these limits are arguably a fact of life, it is
clear that our current mathematical tools
are sufficient to highlight them, but not
to provide a comprehensive satisfactory
theory of evolution on complex adaptive
landscapes. 
Of course, these are not reasons to
despair, just inspiration for more work 
to come. However, the considerations 
submitted here do underscore not only
that the world is neither made wholly of
spandrels nor of panglossianisms, but
also that simply saying that the true
answer lies in the proverbial middle is
not really saying much – unless one is
prepared to roll up one’s sleeves and
thoroughly investigate that middle
ground for decades to come.
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The latitudinal gradient in species rich-ness, perhaps the most conspicuous
feature of global biogeography, has
intrigued ecologists and biogeographers
continuously since the times of de Can-
dolle (Ref. 1, pp. 1270–1276) and Wallace
(Ref. 2, pp. 65–68). In spite of this long
history, consensus on the causes of tropi-
cal peaks in species richness remains elu-
sive3–5. The overwhelming range of
hypotheses proposed to account for
changes of species richness (Palmer6
lists 120 named hypotheses for variation
in species richness or coexistence, and
Rohde7 identifies 28 specifically applied
to the latitudinal gradient) makes the
task of sorting out which factors are
causal and which are incidental a daunt-
ing one. Increasingly, using computation-
ally intensive methods, ecologists and
biogeographers are looking for answers
at a regional or a global scale, putting
models and hypotheses7–15 to the test
against increasingly comprehensive dis-
tributional data encompassing the still
poorly known tropics15–19.
This search has taken an unexpected
turn. In spite of the plethora of climatic,
ecological, evolutionary and historical
explanations proposed to explain biogeo-
graphic diversity patterns, something
fundamental has, until recently, been
almost completely ignored: the geometry
of species ranges in relation to geographi-
cal boundaries. Based both on simu-
lations11,12,14 and on analytical null mod-
els13,15, it is now clear that a mid-domain
peak or plateau in species richness is
inevitable for virtually any set of ranges,
theoretical or empirical, when these
ranges are randomly placed within a
bounded geographical domain, in the
complete absence of any supposition of
environmental gradients within the
domain. Qualitatively, this result sur-
vives a wide range of changes in model
details and assumptions. Quantitatively,
it explains a surprisingly large propor-
tion of geographic variation in species
richness for diverse groups of organisms,
for the empirical cases so far examined.
In spite of conceptual antecedents in the
ecological literature dating back more
than 40 years20, and a substantial litera-
ture on formally analogous problems in
niche overlap and phenology (Box 1),
this important result seems to have gone
unnoticed until 1994 (Ref. 11).
What do the geometric 
models predict?
There is a growing consensus that the
regional pool of species is the key deter-
minant of the species composition of
more or less unsaturated local communi-
ties21,22. Based on regional biotas, geo-
metric models11,13–15 demonstrate that
the stochastic placement of species
ranges between shared geographic
boundaries can generate precise predic-
tions of species richness at points
between the boundaries. For example, in
the case of random, one-dimensional
placement of ranges between two bound-
aries, the null models predict a convex,
symmetrical pattern of species richness:
this pattern is either parabolic11,13 or
quasi-parabolic11,15 depending upon
alternative distributions of range sizes
and of midpoints (Fig. 1; Boxes 2 and 3).
An instructive way to grasp this idea
quickly is to experiment with a null
model that simulates range size and ran-
domizes range placement within differ-
ently defined boundaries11 (Fig. 1). (A
graphical simulation program, that not
only implements the principal stochastic
range model variants, but also allows
input of empirical range-size frequency
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Geographic patterns of species richness are influenced by many factors, but the role
of shared physiographical and physiological boundaries in relation to range-size
distributions has been surprisingly neglected, in spite of the fact that such geometric
constraints lead to mid-domain richness peaks even without environmental
gradients (the mid-domain effect). Relying on null models, several recent studies
have begun to quantify this problem using simulated and empirical data. This
approach promises to transform how we perceive geographic variation in diversity,
including the long unresolved latitudinal gradient in species richness. The question is
not whether geometry affects such patterns, but by how much.
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